The UK will gain very little from blocking a deal on the EU budget by Begg, Iain
blo gs.lse.ac.uk
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/11/14/the-uk-will-gain-very-little-from-blocking-a-deal-on-the-eu-budget/
He rman Van Ro mp uy, Cre d it: Chatham Ho use  (CC BY
2.0)
The UK will gain very little from blocking a deal on the EU
budget.
by Blog Admin
On the 22nd and 23rd of November, the European Council will meet to discuss the next
seven years (2014-2020) of the EU budget. While this process is typically prolonged and
divisive, the upcoming negotiations are expected to be particularly problematic due to the
commitment of the UK government to avoid a real-terms increase in the overall size of the
budget. Iain Begg argues that there is very little to be gained from the UK blocking a deal,
and that making excessive demands may carry a significant financial and political cost for
the country.
Here we go again… Every seven years the EU has to agree a medium term deal f or the EU budget,
known as the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), and every time it becomes a protracted,
acrimonious, but ult imately pretty pointless exercise in arm-wrestling.
The purpose of  the MFF is to establish ceilings f or expenditure under dif f erent headings f or each of  the
seven years f rom 2014-2020. There is then a separate negotiation f or each year, but it is the MFF,
because it sets the limits, which is the major polit ical decision. As always, the temperature rises as the
time f or decision approaches. National leaders adopt mutually exclusive posit ions, the European
Parliament and the European Commission try to explain why their plans f or a bigger budget should be
adopted, while euro-sceptics everywhere compete to prove that EU spending is so wastef ul that it
should be cut drastically.
Ever optimistic, Herman Van Rompuy has decided to devote an entire European Council meeting, to be
held on the 22nd and 23rd of  November, to trying to reach a deal. His chances of  success have already
been dealt a blow by the f ailure last week to reach an agreement on the 2013 annual budget, amid
recriminations between the Council of  Ministers and the European Parliament, the two arms of  the
budgetary authority.
A f ew days bef orehand, in the UK, a peculiar alliance
between the Labour party and the euro-sceptic wing of  the
Tories won a vote in the House of  Commons, calling f or a
real terms cut in the new MFF, compared with its
predecessor. The government promptly signalled its
intention not to be bound by this vote, but there can be
litt le doubt that the UK will struggle to obtain what it wants
and that a nasty f ight is in prospect. This raises the
obvious question of  what the UK really stands to gain and
whether it is worth expending its increasingly scarce
polit ical capital on it.
So what does Britain want? The basis f or discussion is
Commission proposals which would see a limited increase
in the budget compared with the seven year period that
ends in 2013. While the Commission has been crit icised f or seeking to increase spending at a t ime when
governments across the continent are having to curb public spending, its proposal would mean an EU
budget that remained more or less stable as a proportion of  EU GDP – just over 1 per cent. As always,
Britain would like more drastic cuts in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and more cuts in the
administrative budget.
The UK also wants to ensure that its rebate, secured nearly thirty years ago by Mrs Thatcher in her
heyday, continues. It is certainly true that without the rebate Britain would f ace an unf air burden, not
because of  what it is required to pay (the UK payments into the EU’s cof f ers, like those of  all other
countries, are more or less proportional to its GDP before the rebate), but because EU spending in the
UK is relatively low. In particular, the UK receives much less than others – most egregiously, France –
f rom the CAP. It is the net balance that justif ies the rebate.
The problem with the UK rebate and the other rebates that have since been given to Austria, Germany,
the Netherlands and Sweden is that they result in a bizarre and opaque system. The Netherlands, f or
example, now benef its f rom f our dif f erent rebates, yet continues in per capita terms to be the biggest
net contributor to the EU budget, and they mean that the (generally richer) biggest net contributors pay
less into the EU budget as a proportion of  their national income than much poorer Member States. No
rational system of  inter-governmental f iscal f lows sets its revenue and spending, then claws back large
amounts to adjust net payments.
On the rebate, the UK tends to be one against the rest, but on issues like the size of  the EU budget
other Member States, such as the Germans, the Swedes and the Dutch, are broadly sympathetic, and
with more Member States set to become signif icant net contributors later in the decade, an extravagant
increase in the EU budget will f ind scant support. Quite simply, it is not going to happen. However, the
others appear to be more willing to accept that a minimal increase may well be a small price to pay f or
reaching agreement. Much acrimony and ef f ort will go into deciding whether the eventual f igure should be
higher or lower by something of  the order of  0.03 per cent of  EU GDP, an amount that would cost or
ref und the average tax-payer in Britain the equivalent of  the duty on about half  a gallon of  petrol per
year.
If  David Cameron blocks a deal, he will look f oolish and will stand to gain litt le. Bluntly, the impact on
Brit ish public f inances of  whatever he achieves will be negligible. But having let the veto genie out of  the
bottle, he has now backed himself  into a corner: concede too much and the UK Parliament will reject the
deal, with repercussions f or the unity of  his party; demand too much and he risks blocking the agreement
in a way that could easily end up costing the UK more, both f inancially and polit ically.
Given the inauspicious outlook, the time-honoured EU solution would be to postpone the negotiations.
Yet all concerned know that a new MFF is needed and that an agreement will eventually be reached, so it
is hard to see what will be gained by ‘kicking the can down the road’. Moreover, a f ailure by Europe’s
heads of  state and of  government to conclude the negotiations this year – bearing in mind that they also
have to persuade the European Parliament – will be disruptive not only to the f unctioning of  the EU, but
also to the implementation of  the major EU spending programmes (such as research or regional
development) that directly benef it Britain.
Af ter two debilitating years of  euro-procrastination and wrangling over how to sort out the sovereign
debt crisis, is it too much to hope that, f or once, sense will prevail?
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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